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Going Global: The International Dimensions of U.S. Homeland
Security Policy
Abstract
Scholarship examining U.S. homeland security policy proceeds from the assumption that
homeland security policy-making is a largely domestic—that is, United Statescentric—endeavor. This article challenges that assumption. The mission of the Homeland
Security Enterprise is domestic security but achieving a satisfactory state of preparation,
prevention, response, recovery and resilience requires efforts that extend beyond our
boundaries. We argue that advances in technology and globalization have accelerated the
degree to which global events directly and indirectly influence U.S. homeland security.
Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries; efforts to counter them,
accordingly, must transcend border lines as well. In this article, we present evidence from
the homeland security sub-fields of border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, public
health, and disaster management to show that U.S. homeland security policy is now
inherently transnational in nature and therefore best analyzed and understood by taking a
broader, global perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, October 27, 2010, a young woman dropped off two
packages in San’a, Yemen—one at a UPS store, the other at a FedEx
location.1 Inside each of the two packages was a Hewlett-Packard
desktop laser printer.2 Yet these were no ordinary shipments of office
supplies. Within the toner cartridge of each printer was a small amount
of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a powerful explosive material
used in construction and industrial work.3 The PETN had been inserted
into the cartridges so that the printers, if X-rayed, would have appeared
to contain ordinary laser printer ink powder.4 The cartridges were wired
to small detonators powered by cell phone batteries.5 Both packages
were addressed to synagogues in Chicago.6 UPS and FedEx employees
in Yemen screened the packages manually, saw nothing obviously amiss
within them, and cleared the packages to be shipped to the United
States.7
The next day, intelligence officials in Saudi Arabia contacted their
counterparts in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to advise them
that they had received a tip about two package bombs constructed by
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that were en route to the
United States—the same two package bombs that had been shipped from
San’a.8 Saudi officials were able to share with their American counterparts
the precise tracking numbers for the packages.9 A furious hunt for the
packages began. Intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic agencies
in the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab
Emirates, and Germany, together with officials from UPS and FedEx,
exchanged information and coordinated their responses to the Saudi
intelligence tip, ultimately leading to the discovery of the package bombs.
Local authorities disarmed the explosives at airports in East Midlands,
England, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.10 Investigators later
determined that the bombs likely would have detonated in mid-flight,
causing the airplanes carrying them to crash into the Atlantic Ocean.11
The 2010 AQAP printer cartridge bomb plot was by any measure a
serious threat to the global supply chain, particularly the U.S. air cargo
system. The plot also illustrates a remarkable shift in our understanding
of U.S. homeland security policy. Virtually every element in the plot, from
the moment the package bombs were dropped off in Sana’a until the
explosives within them were disarmed in England and the United Arab
Emirates, took place outside the United States. The cooperation and
coordination of multiple governments’ security services and at least two
air express carriers in the private sector led to the package bombs being
located and disabled before the package bombs arrived in the United States.
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689
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Most academic research on U.S. homeland security proceeds from the
assumption that contemporary U.S. homeland security policy-making is
largely a domestic endeavor. This article challenges that assumption. We
argue that advances in technology and globalization have accelerated
the degree to which transnational events directly and indirectly influence
U.S. homeland security.12 In this article, “transnational” refers to the
coalitions, contacts, and interactions that take place across state borders
that are not controlled exclusively by the central foreign policy organs of
governments.13
Hardly any homeland threat today does not generate a cause or effect
abroad. Our homeland security begins and ends not at the borders of the
United States, but internationally, where people commence their travel
and cargo goods are loaded for transport. It may sound paradoxical, but
the fact remains that for the United States to have satisfactory homeland
security, we need to direct our attention toward what is happening
abroad. It is through collaboration with our foreign allies, in border
security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism, that the United States
will more effectively be protected. Many readers may be surprised to
learn, for example, that the Department of Homeland Security now has the
third largest civilian footprint outside of the United States of all federal
agencies.14 Yet the scholarly literature on homeland security has not yet
caught up with this evolution.
The article proceeds in four steps. First, we introduce and describe the
Westphalian nation-state system, which at first glance may appear to
conflict with countering the global, dynamic, and persistent threats
confronting the United States. We then show that scholarship on U.S.
homeland security policy largely overlooks transnational security
considerations. Next, we present evidence from the homeland security
sub-fields of border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, disaster
management, and public health to demonstrate that transnational security
concerns are integral to U.S. homeland security. The article concludes with
a discussion of the policy and research implications of our findings.

NATION-STATES, TRANSNATIONAL FLOWS,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
International relations scholars usually point to the Treaty of Westphalia
in 1648 as the start of the modern nation-state system.15 The treaty ended
the Thirty Years War in Europe and set in motion a system whereby
sovereign European states began to co-exist.16 This system involved
Journal of Strategic Security
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principles such as mutual respect for the territorial integrity of states,
agreements not to interfere in other nations’ internal affairs, and the
legal equality of nation-states within the broader international system.
As European influence spread globally, these pronounced concepts of
sovereignty and nationality, and the prerogatives and implications which
attached to them, were disseminated, as well.
Today, sovereignty asserts itself at national borders by determining who
and what may enter, exit, or cross the space.17 This exercise of sovereignty
along nation-states’ borders has long been a means for governments to
assert and maintain internal political control.18 At the same time, nations
levy customs and travel fees on the cross-border movement of people
and goods to generate revenue. Borders today can therefore be thought
of as both lines of sovereignty and points of flow. This new understanding
of borders as lines and flows challenges the Westphalian conception of
borders solely as “hard” boundaries around sovereign nation-states.
To be clear, we are not suggesting that sovereign borders have become
irrelevant or unimportant. However, because of accelerating technological
innovation, time and space have been dramatically compressed such
that global flows today are non-stop, and in many cases, instantaneous.
Globalization is the cumulative effect of these trends: a 24/7/365
movement continuously around the world of capital, labor, cargo, people,
goods, services, ideas, images, data, and electrons. These flows today
often operate independent of nation-states. They are the decisions
of actors such as multinational corporations, terrorist movements,
transnational criminal organizations, and other non-state actors. For this
reason, they are sometimes referred to as “borderless” or “stateless”
phenomena. Nevertheless, they continue to flow toward and over
Westphalian borders, have their principal effects within nation-states, and
the governments operating there regulate the actors. This presents us
with an apparent contradiction: The sovereign power to regulate crossborder flows remains exclusively national, while the flows themselves—
lawful and illicit—essentially are transnational.
The homeland security mission is to protect domestic security. However,
achieving a satisfactory state of preparation, prevention, recovery, and
resilience in the domestic context requires efforts that extend beyond
our borders. Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries.
Responses to these challenges, accordingly, must also transcend the
borders that separate one country from another. Terrorism, cyberattacks,
narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, pandemic diseases, money
laundering, and natural disasters are transnational security challenges
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689
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with clear implications for U.S. homeland security policy. Understanding
these threats, and developing innovative solutions to them, requires that
security practitioners in the United States and abroad share information,
collaborate, and adjust how they execute policies over time. For those
working in the homeland security profession today, it comes as no
surprise that the U.S. government must work regularly with allied nations
and multilateral organizations to achieve its own homeland security
objectives.19 The global homeland security enterprise—consisting of strong
international engagement, cooperative partnerships among governments,
and between the private and public sectors—is necessary for the security
of all.

HOMELAND SECURITY SCHOLARSHIP: A NEXT
GENERATION PERSPECTIVE
Existing scholarly conceptions of homeland security are almost entirely
domestic in orientation and have been this way for well over a decade. It
is important to emphasize that this literature is generally solid, focusing
on significant domestic coordination and security challenges. However,
it is incomplete, overlooking an important and expanding dimension of
homeland security.
The years pre-dating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 saw
tremendous shifts in foreign policy emphases as well as the growth of
terrorist attacks on U.S. targets from domestic and international actors.
The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union, which took
place from approximately 1947 until the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991,
provides important historical context for understanding the growth in
counterterrorism activities after 9/11. Some of the most prominent pre-9/11
scholarship from the Cold War focused on the potential defenses against
a Soviet nuclear attack on U.S. soil, for example, foreshadowing the rise of
emergency management activities in the years after 9/11.20
Terrorist attacks against U.S. government facilities in Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania between 1983 and 1998 underlined the rising
threat posed by international terrorist groups.21 The bombings of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, as well as the
World Trade Center in 1993, demonstrated that terrorists were capable of
carrying out dramatic attacks inside the United States.22 Writing in Foreign
Policy in 1997, John Deutch, a former director of the CIA during the
Clinton administration, noted that “…if we are going to mount an effective
campaign to combat [terrorism], we must clarify the roles and missions
Journal of Strategic Security
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of various government agencies. As it stands now, the responsibility for
counterterrorist initiatives is divided.”23 Others scholars took up this theme
of how to organize government agencies more effectively to combat
terrorism in subsequent years.
Later research explored the ways in which misaligned U.S. agency and
departmental missions left open significant gaps in the United States’
ability to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks.24 These analyses
focused on domestic policy affairs. Writing in spring 2001, Richard
Falkenrath described a White House in the late 1990s which sought
to coordinate a sprawling range of counterterrorism programs across
the executive branch—a situation similar to conditions in the executive
branch today.25 Falkenrath included a small reference to U.S. international
counterterrorism assistance programs, but he placed this reference in a
domestic policy context: “U.S. officials argue that [providing international
counterterrorism assistance] has had considerable success in promoting
greater counterterrorism efforts and discreet cooperation among other
states, especially in curtailing state sponsorship of international terrorism.
Critics argue that the U.S. response is excessive.”26
Widely cited work published in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks similarly focused on domestic policy-making and politics. For
example, research by Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader on the challenge
of organizing the federal government to address homeland security
threats does not mention other national governments or international
organizations at all, though it does acknowledge the threat posed by
international terrorism.27
Still other scholars have addressed transnational threats and their impact
on domestic security policy-making in a general sense. These treatments
of transnational threats are usually tangential and not U.S.-centric.
For example, one 2009 study on the growing linkages among internal
and external security problems used a primarily European perspective
for its analyses.28 This research pointed out that most security studies
scholarship “very rarely” ties together international and domestic security
problems, underlining the need for the present study, which focuses on
the transnational dimensions of U.S. homeland security.29 Other research
has examined related issues, such as the connections among crossborder migration and globalization-related phenomena like trade, or the
collective action problems that can arise when multiple nations attempt to
coordinate their respective counterterrorism policies.30
Later post-9/11 research continued to emphasize domestic policy
concerns by examining, for instance, domestic inter-organizational
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689
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coordination in response to disasters and prevention of global pandemics
that may make their way to U.S. shores.31 A 2011 study that appeared
in Policy Studies Journal sought to understand the cross-cutting policy
forces that brought about the homeland security enterprise during
the 2001-2004 time period.32 However, this work, too, overlooks the
interactions between U.S.-based homeland security officials and overseas
partners in its analyses.
Only recently have scholars begun to grapple with how traditional
notions of U.S. homeland security interact with transnational security
considerations. One example appeared in October 2017, when Philip
Osborn challenged the idea that cyberspace is borderless.33 Cyberspace
includes physical infrastructure, which crosses sovereign borders, such as
Internet cables. Therefore, Osborn argued, traditional customs authorities
could be invoked to examine these cables and their digital contents for
homeland security purposes.34
To be sure, federal agencies that later were folded into the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had, to varying degrees,
established international ties with foreign counterpart agencies prior to
9/11.35 Other non-DHS agencies that today form part of the homeland
security enterprise, such as the CIA, also worked with international
partners before the 9/11 attacks.36 Moreover, international groups, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have acted for years as
hubs for the exchange of important information among their members.
Nevertheless, we maintain that there at least two key differences between
these pre-9/11 international activities and the types of transnational
homeland security initiatives that are apparent today. First, international
cooperation pre-dating the 9/11 attacks was largely ad-hoc, in the sense
that it was not geared toward achieving a cohesive group of policy goals
that transcended multiple government agencies. Second, pre-9/11 global
collaboration along these lines was not born out of the recognition that
tackling U.S. homeland security threats abroad—in a systematic fashion—
can yield domestic security dividends. Rather, this pre-9/11 collaboration
was oriented toward solving discrete sets of policy problems that
were bounded by the specific missions of the government agencies
participating in these partnerships.37 In both form and substance, then,
transnational homeland security activities today represent a fundamental
break from past practice.
It is now essential to advance understandings of the transnational
dimensions of U.S. homeland security to increase knowledge of policy
options and limitations in the homeland security sphere. By framing
Journal of Strategic Security
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homeland security in a transnational security context, policy-makers stand
to make better-informed decisions about how to formulate strategies and
allocate scarce time and resources to achieve their homeland security
objectives. At the same time, understanding the transnational dimensions
of homeland security fosters awareness of the limitations of internal
security policies limited to the domestic context.38
It is also imperative to bring current homeland security scholarship
into line with contemporary practices in homeland security. Squaring
homeland security as it is conducted with the broader literature on
homeland security policy can benefit scholars by offering a more accurate
assessment of policy conditions, which in turn can lead to analyses that
are more precise. We next turn to the first of five homeland security subfields that this article examines: border security.

BORDER SECURITY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures and expedites
the movement of people and goods across U.S. borders.39 In a
globalized world, where technology has accelerated both transport
and communication, the ports of entry at air, sea, and land borders
have become the last line of defense, rather than the first, as they
traditionally have been viewed. For example, the so-called Underwear
Bomber, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, boarded a plane
in the Netherlands intending to ignite PETN explosive material and
blow up a Northwest Airlines flight over Detroit in 2009. CBP identified
Abdulmutallab as a person of interest after the flight departed from
Amsterdam bound for Detroit. CBP officers planned to refer him for
secondary inspection upon his arrival in the United States. However,
this obviously would have been too late to prevent Abdulmutallab from
blowing up the plane. Therefore, in retrospect, the “border” we needed
to focus on was located not in Detroit, but at Schipol Airport in the
Netherlands.40 The goal of border security, too, needed to change in
this instance. Rather than intercepting Abdulmutallab upon his arrival in
Detroit, U.S. homeland security interests would have been best served by
preventing Abdulmutallab from boarding the Northwest Airlines flight in
the first place.
Today CBP and other U.S. agencies with a stake in border security have
pushed their operations “out”; that is, away from U.S. borders and toward
the last point of departure abroad for people and goods bound for the
United States.41 The U.S. government’s new global approach to border
security is evident in operations conducted by CBP, Immigrations and
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689
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Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Coast Guard, and Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), in conjunction with partner agencies abroad.
The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), including Passenger
Name Records (PNR), are collected by airlines regarding each air traveler
boarding a plane for travel in and toward the United States. CBP screens
this data against information about known or suspected terrorists and
other high-risk individuals. The Underwear Bomber plot highlighted
the need to conduct the APIS and PNR security checks before planes
departed for the United States rather than shortly before they arrived in
the United States.42 Terrorists must be kept from boarding planes bound
for the United States and not just prevented from being admitted into the
country. This necessarily requires DHS component agencies to operate
abroad by collaborating with foreign partners.43
CBP has made strides in developing a permanent overseas presence to
stop or intercept dangerous people and things from making their way
to the United States. For example, CBP officers based in Canada, the
Caribbean, and the United Arab Emirates are an integral part of CBP’s
preclearance program.44 This program deploys uniformed CBP officers
abroad to screen people and goods bound for the United States at their
original point of departure, rather than upon arrival in the United States.45
In addition, CBP sends plainclothes officers to work in foreign airports
through its Joint Security Program and Immigration Advisory Program.46
These initiatives require close collaboration among CBP, airlines, and host
country border and law enforcement agencies, with a view to stopping
potentially dangerous individuals from flying to the United States.47
The preclearance program has produced encouraging results. A 2017
report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a federal
watchdog, found that preclearance programs prevented over 10,000
potentially dangerous passengers from boarding aircraft bound for the
United States in fiscal year 2015 alone.48 This suggests that the program is
achieving the desired effect of preventing potentially hostile actors from
boarding U.S.-bound flights.
CBP’s Container Security Initiative (CSI) complements the preclearance
program, in that it focuses on intercepting potentially hazardous cargo
destined for the United States at departure points abroad. The CSI now
has a presence at over 50 maritime ports around the world.49 Dating
from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CSI
uses intelligence and automated tools to identify potentially high-risk
containers that may contain weapons or weapons precursors that could
Journal of Strategic Security
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be used by terrorists.50 Containers that are deemed high-risk are then
screened using other technologies, such as X-ray machines or radiation
detection devices.51 Some eighty percent of containers bound for the
United States are now screened overseas through the CSI.52
There is limited publicly available data on the effectiveness of the CSI. One
2015 GAO report indicated that CBP was not able to provide complete
data on the disposition of certain containers that it had determined were
high-risk.53 This suggests that it is at least possible that certain highrisk containers were released from CBP custody without being properly
screened or accounted for. Still, the CSI clearly represents an advance
in cargo screening techniques for the United States, because it uses a
systematic, intelligence-driven approach to target and screen higher risk
cargo containers. In addition, it does so by enlisting time and space as
early as possible and as far away geographically as possible before the
goods arrive at U.S. ports of entry.54
CBP also manages the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program (ACAS),
which began in June 2018.55 The program requires foreign entities to
submit, in advance, information about the goods they are shipping to
CBP. Moreover, it is worth underscoring that this information sharing with
CBP takes places prior to the point at which cargo is actually loaded on
U.S.-bound aircraft. In this way, CBP is able to gain a better understanding
of the goods that are being transported to the United States. In cases
where there may be doubt or suspicion about certain cargo, CBP can
work with shippers to prevent the cargo from being placed on aircraft.
This sequence of steps can reduce the risks posed to aircraft, airline
passengers, and the transportation sector as a whole by hazardous cargo.
Moreover, it pushes the point of air cargo screening as far from physical
U.S. borders as possible. ICE uses similar tactics abroad with respect to
potential high-risk travelers to the United States.
Officials from ICE work with U.S. and foreign government agencies to stop
potentially threatening individuals from making their way to the United
States. For instance, DHS routinely places ICE officers in U.S. embassies
as part of the Visa Security Program, where they collaborate with State
Department (DOS) officials to screen U.S. visa applicants.56 These visa
screenings target would-be terrorists and international criminals who,
using fraudulently obtained visas, would otherwise seek to enter the
United States and harm others.57 ICE officials also liaise with counterpart
agencies in Mexico and Central America to obtain biometric data, such
as fingerprints and photos, of Central American migrants and national
“special interest aliens” from third countries who may pass through
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689
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Mexico en route to the United States.58 Moreover, ICE works with the
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, among other
nations, to arrest members of violent transnational gangs and human
trafficking organizations.59 Of course, the illegal movement of people
and goods is not limited to land. Water-based trafficking of migrants and
drugs presents challenges for homeland security, too.
Coast Guard personnel, like their ICE counterparts, work to reduce the
risk of potentially threatening individuals and cargo entering the United
States. One of the most visible examples of this work is the interdiction
of illegal narcotics in the Caribbean. CBP operates several P-3 Orion
surveillance aircraft and uses these planes to collect intelligence on
suspicious vessels, which it then relays to Coast Guard ships.60 The Coast
Guard ships, in turn, can set a course to intercept the suspicious vessels
and determine whether they merit further investigation. Coast Guard
personnel may also identify and stop potential drug trafficking on their
own. For example, in 2013, a Coast Guard helicopter was used to shoot
out the engine of a go-fast boat in the Caribbean, bound for the United
States, carrying some $35 million dollars’ worth of cocaine.61
The Coast Guard also plays a part in stopping irregular migrants who
attempt to make their way to the United States. In 2015, for instance,
the Coast Guard began to see a sharp increase in the number of Cuban
migrants intercepted in the Caribbean who were bound for the United
States.62 When the Coast Guard detains migrants at sea, the agency will
usually transfer those detained migrants to ICE, which then arranges for
the migrants to be returned to their countries of origin.63
Interdictions of drugs and people like these are routine for the Coast
Guard. In addition, they form part of a broader-based homeland security
strategy. By conducting these operations in the Caribbean, the Coast
Guard can stop the movement of potentially dangerous people and things
toward the United States far from actual U.S. borders. The TSA carries out
complementary operations in foreign airports with the aid of counterpart
agencies.
The TSA must rely on foreign air transportation authorities to implement
its security directives.64 For example, in 2017 U.S. intelligence agencies
learned of a plot by ISIS to embed explosives in electronic devices, such
as laptops and tablets.65 In response to this intelligence, the TSA issued
new guidelines for U.S.-bound airline passengers that imposed restrictions
on carrying certain devices in aircraft cabins. In the United Kingdom,
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for example, these guidelines effectively banned any device larger than
a smartphone from being placed in carry-on luggage.66 This example
underscores the importance of close working relationships between the
TSA and its counterparts abroad. Without these relationships, the TSA
would have a much more difficult time ensuring the safety of U.S.-bound
airline passengers. It is also worth noting that the TSA operates several
programs related to the screening of cargo on passenger flights.67 These
programs outline the specific technologies that transportation firms can
use to screen air cargo. The programs also provide a means for firms to
become certified cargo carriers.68
The operations discussed above by CBP, ICE, the Coast Guard, and
TSA offer compelling evidence that the United States today takes an
international approach to securing U.S. borders. These measures seek to
push the point of security screening far from U.S. borders, thus reducing
exclusive reliance on more rigorous screening at U.S. borders themselves.
Border security is closely linked to U.S. counterterrorism policy, which we
address in the next section.

COUNTERTERRORISM
The United States’ efforts to prevent terrorist attacks have led to a wide
array of transnational counterterrorism initiatives undertaken on a “whole
of government” basis. We explore here the military operations, economic
sanctions, and intelligence cooperation that the United States leverages
to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks occurring inside the United
States.
The U.S. military campaign to stop terrorists overseas before they
directly threaten the United States has taken numerous forms. The
most prominent recent example of this activity is the U.S. Department
of Defense’s Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve,
which was established in 2014 to combat the rising threat posed by the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).69 Together with the United States,
79 partner nations have contributed military assets and resources to
erode ISIS’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside the Middle East.
Contributors to this task force include nations with large, professional
militaries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as well as
nations with less robust military forces, such as Bulgaria and Fiji.70 At the
time of the writing, the coalition’s efforts have been largely successful.
ISIS’s geographical footprint in the Middle East has collapsed.71 The
group’s ability to carry out attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East has
declined.72 Despite ISIS having weakened, the group still poses a threat to
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1689
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the United States, in that it has proven adept at inspiring so-called “lone
wolf” terrorists to strike targets inside the United States.73
International economic sanctions are tools designed to cut off terrorist
financing sources. These sanctions usually prohibit the transfer of money
or goods between sanctioned persons or entities, businesses, and financial
institutions. The United States must rely on foreign financial institutions
and governments to execute these sanctions. Since the U.S. dollar is
universally respected as a kind of “global currency,” and given that U.S.
financial institutions act as a hub for an enormous number of international
financial transactions each day, the U.S. government can compel foreign
financial institutions and governments to implement these sanctions. In
addition, foreign financial institutions can incur penalties for violating
these sanctions. That can shut them out from the global financial system.
These institutions, therefore, have powerful incentives to comply with the
U.S. government’s demands.
Sanctions have been a preferred tool of both Republican and Democratic
administrations. Before the United States fired a single missile into
Afghanistan in 2001, President George W. Bush signed Executive
Order 13224, which barred financial transactions with a list of 29 known
terrorist organizations and suspected individual terrorists.74 The Obama
administration used sanctions to pressure the government of Iran, a
designated state-sponsor of terrorism, to stop developing its suspected
clandestine nuclear weapons program.75 In addition, the Obama White
House helped to spearhead the adoption of United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council Resolution 2178, which explicitly called upon U.N.
member states to disrupt financial transactions that may benefit terrorist
organizations.76 President Donald Trump has signaled that he may impose
financial sanctions on government officials in Pakistan if they do not
stop promoting militant groups.77 At the same time, it is important to
note that financial sanctions are blunt tools that can trigger unforeseen
consequences, such as discouraging banks from setting up operations in
contested areas. Still, given that each U.S. presidential administration since
the 9/11 attacks has used sanctions to target terrorist financing, it stands
to reason that these sanctions—while limited in their effectiveness—will
continue to be used for the foreseeable future. In a similar vein, foreign
governments have also played important parts in sharing intelligence that
benefits U.S. homeland security interests.
There have been dramatic increases in international intelligence
cooperation for counterterrorism since the 9/11 attacks. This cooperation
appears to have had a direct, positive impact upon U.S. homeland
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security. We acknowledge that intelligence is, by nature, secret. Success
stories in the intelligence business are rarely made public. We must
therefore rely on publicly available accounts of international intelligence
sharing to assess its effects, both perceived and real.
Perhaps most notable among the United States’ intelligence-sharing
agreements is the so-called “Five Eyes” group, consisting of Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.78 The
origins of the Five Eyes group can be traced to accords between the
United States and United Kingdom in the period during and immediately
following World War II.79 Terrorism-related intelligence is today especially
prized among Five Eyes members. U.S. government officials have publicly
acknowledged the benefits of intelligence sharing for counterterrorism
with Five Eyes members, too. For example, in 2004 U.S. Senate testimony,
the U.S. State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism cited
cooperation with the United Kingdom, along with France and Mexico,
as being helpful for the United States in its response to specific aviation
threats around Christmas 2003.80 More recently, in 2015 an Obama
administration-backed U.N. Security Council resolution called for greater
information sharing on the movement of so-called “foreign fighters”
seeking to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.81 In addition, in 2017, a meeting of
security and justice officials from the Five Eyes group generated a joint
communiqué noting the group’s mutual commitment to share timely,
detailed information on terrorist and foreign fighter activity.82 Each
of these examples underscores the strong link between international
intelligence sharing practices and U.S. homeland security.
There are practical reasons that the United States shares intelligence with
its allies. The United States is widely believed to be the most advanced
of the Five Eyes members in terms of its ability to capture signals
intelligence (SIGINT), such as emails, phone calls, and text messages.83
The U.S. government shares SIGINT with other Five Eyes members.84
At the same time, the United States has comparatively weak abilities
to collect intelligence from human sources, or HUMINT.85 Therefore, the
United States must sometimes rely on the stronger HUMINT capabilities
of its allies to collect HUMINT.86 The differing comparative advantages of
the United States and allied intelligence services can lead to exchanges.
The United States may agree to send SIGINT collected from a target
to another Five Eyes member. In return, the United States may receive
HUMINT that the other Five Eyes member collected. This hypothetical
HUMINT-for-SIGINT exchange points toward the importance of
transnational intelligence cooperation for homeland security. Without this
cooperation, U.S. policymakers can suffer from a less complete picture of
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the threats that they face, potentially leading to less-informed decisions
and less desirable outcomes. The need for intelligence on cyber threats
has also grown in recent years. The next section explores the transnational
dimensions of cybersecurity.

CYBERSECURITY
Cybersecurity concerns have risen in prominence within homeland
security circles during the past ten years. Given that cyberspace is
essentially borderless, the United States government’s efforts to address
these concerns have led to new levels of international cooperation
to combat cyber threats. In May 2011 the United States issued a new
International Strategy for Cyberspace to provide a blueprint for building
an international framework to make cyberspace secure and reliable.
This requires a full range of partners—including other U.S. government
agencies, the private sector, individual users of the internet, and
international partners across the world. This strategy is not just a U.S.
initiative, either. It is an invitation to other countries, organizations, and
people to build innovative global networks. Especially notable in this
regard are U.S. collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, the DOS and
DHS prioritize the use of bilateral partnerships in carrying out their
respective cybersecurity missions: DOS to pursue cyber cooperation
through diplomacy and DHS to promote private sector civilian
cybersecurity and protect the federal .gov domain.
NATO is a valuable forum for the United States to advance its
cybersecurity objectives. When the United States participates in
cybersecurity initiatives through NATO, this serves at least two purposes:
strengthening the cybersecurity posture of fellow NATO members
and advancing U.S. homeland security interests. The United States
government contributes significantly to the rising importance of NATO
in cybersecurity. For example, a former DOD official was recently named
head of NATO’s Communications and Information Agency—the specific
unit responsible for the alliance’s cybersecurity initiatives.87 The Tallinn
Manual, an academic publication whose production NATO facilitated,
represents the most comprehensive attempt yet to reconcile existing
provisions of international law and the unique legal complexities
surrounding conflict in cyberspace.88 U.S. scholars contributed
significantly to the Tallinn Manual’s development, including James Bret
Michael of the Naval Postgraduate School, Eric Talbott Jensen of Brigham
Young University, and Chris Jenks of Southern Methodist University, all
of whom are listed as contributors in the Manual itself. Beyond important
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law and policy-related considerations, the United States has also applied
its technical prowess to NATO’s cybersecurity initiatives. For instance,
in April 2017, the United States participated in a NATO-sponsored cyber
defense exercise that included participants from 25 nations.89
The United States’ cooperation with the EU on cybersecurity issues
dates to at least 2010. In that year, Obama administration officials and
EU representatives launched the Working Group on Cybercrime and
Cybersecurity to advance transatlantic cooperation for cybersecurity.90
The Working Group collaborates on areas of mutual concern, such as
cyber incident management and critical infrastructure protection.91 The
EU-US cooperation on cybersecurity issues will likely continue due in part
to shared democratic values.92 A 2014 EU-sponsored study published
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies supports this idea,
noting that there is great potential for transatlantic collaboration in
constructing cyber “norms” for states.93
Both the DOS and DHS make international coordination for cybersecurity
an integral part of their respective operations. For example, in March
2016, the State Department released its international cyberspace policy
strategy.94 This strategy document lists numerous achievements that the
State Department cites as examples of its diplomats promoting global
norms in cyberspace to address international security concerns. These
achievements include securing commitments from G20 leaders in 2015
to refrain from stealing intellectual property online, as well the United
Nations’ adoption of a U.S.-led framework for stability in cyberspace.95
These examples demonstrate that the DOS, working through international
institutions, has taken steps that in its view advance U.S. security interests.
DHS has also leveraged its relationships with foreign governments and
international organizations to advance U.S. cybersecurity interests. For
example, since 2006 DHS has organized a biennial exercise called “Cyber
Storm” to evaluate the abilities of U.S. government entities and U.S. allies
to manage significant cyber events.96 The most recent of these exercises,
Cyber Storm V, took place in 2016, and incorporated teams from most
U.S. federal agencies, many U.S. state governments, over two dozen
businesses, and 12 partner nations, including Australia, Hungary, New
Zealand, and Switzerland.97 It is telling that DHS involved so many partner
nations in Cyber Storm V. This broad involvement illustrates the extent
to which DHS views international cooperation as essential to achieve
its cybersecurity objectives. DHS has also emphasized internally the
importance of expanding global cooperation for cybersecurity. The U.S.
Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and its counterparts
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abroad meet routinely, further demonstrating the importance DHS
attaches to its international partners.98
The need to strengthen international collaboration for cybersecurity
has led the United States to ink several bilateral agreements with other
nations, as well. For example, in 2015, President Obama and Chinese
President Xi Jinping agreed in principle to refrain from engaging in
government-sponsored online theft of intellectual property.99 In April
2017, representatives from the DOS and the government of Argentina
signed an agreement intended to develop policy communication channels
for cybersecurity topics like critical infrastructure protection.100 In May
2017, DHS finalized an agreement that would fund joint research among
scientists in the United States and the Netherlands on the defense of
industrial control systems (ICSs).101 Two months later, a DHS delegation
flew to Tel Aviv, Israel to sign an accord that would develop joint working
groups addressing topics such as international cyber policy, research and
development, and the future cybersecurity workforce.102 These examples
of cybersecurity-oriented international agreements highlight the degree
to which DHS and other federal agencies now approach cybersecurity as
an international matter of concern.
The steps taken above to bolster the United States’ cybersecurity
capabilities take place amidst a rising tide of cyber threats. The Russian
government, in particular, has ratcheted up efforts to delegitimize and
destabilize the U.S. government using online tactics.103 For example,
DHS concluded that the Russian government scanned electronic voting
systems for potential vulnerabilities to exploit in over a dozen states
during the 2016 Presidential Election.104 In addition, the U.S. Intelligence
Community found that the Russian government executed a “multifaceted”
influence campaign during the 2016 election, seeking to sway the
views of American voters using social media platforms.105 After leaving
government, James Clapper, a former U.S. Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), flatly concluded that Russian cyber intrusions and manipulation
of information “swung” the election in favor of Donald Trump.106 At the
time of the writing, U.S. government investigations into the 2016 Russian
influence campaign continue under Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller.
Their outcomes are not certain. Nonetheless, the existence of this Russia
influence campaign reinforces the urgency of the U.S. government’s
efforts to strengthen U.S. computer networks against malicious attacks. In
addition, the prospect of future online influence campaigns will no doubt
figure prominently in discussions about the security of future U.S. elections.
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PUBLIC HEALTH
The U.S. government recognizes that the spread of global pandemics can
pose serious risks to U.S. homeland security. Diseases can travel rapidly
from one nation to another. Deadly strains of bacteria and viruses pose
immediate and potentially widespread threats to persons inside the
United States. Three ways the U.S. government advances public health
initiatives are via global disease surveillance networks, international
pandemic prevention campaigns, and deliveries of emergency assistance
to nations suffering pandemics.
Within the federal government, numerous agencies share responsibilities
for coordinating surveillance of international pandemics. The U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), located within the DOS, operates
the Emerging Pandemic Threats program.107 This program focuses
on building the capacity of local, regional, and national governments
to prevent, diagnose, and treat potential pandemics.108 This capacity
building comes about by focusing on so-called “hot spot” areas, such
as Central Africa, to amplify the potential impacts of USAID’s efforts.109
However, USAID is not the only federal agency to monitor pandemics
globally. The Department of Defense’s Chemical and Biological Defense
Program conducts bio surveillance activities overseas and develops new
detection and diagnosis technologies.110 In addition, the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a component agency of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), carries out
sophisticated research on some of the deadliest known pathogens, such
as the Ebola virus.111
The United States has also embraced a transnational approach to prevent
pandemics by promoting specific disease-prevention initiatives. For
example, the George W. Bush administration launched the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, to reduce deaths from HIV/
AIDS in Africa.112 PEPFAR relies on networks of on-the-ground partners
in Africa to implement the program and stay focused on results.113 Public
health officials credit the program with saving the lives of millions in
Africa.114 There is a powerful moral case to be made for saving persons
infected with HIV/AIDS in Africa. However, PEPFAR also advances
U.S. homeland security, in that it helps prevent the spread of an illness,
which, even with effective preventions and treatments, continues to kill
thousands of Americans each year.115
When pandemics occur abroad, the U.S. government can be swift to
intervene with emergency assistance. This aid bolsters U.S. homeland
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security, because it works to reduce the probability of deadly pandemics
affecting large segments of the U.S. population. For example, during the
2009 outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus, the U.S. government spent
some $16 million in international assistance funds via USAID, the CDC, and
the Department of Defense to aid nations in Latin America struggling to
contain the spread of the disease.116 A 2014 West African outbreak of the
Ebola virus, which causes fatal hemorrhaging, led to a significantly larger,
multi-pronged U.S. government response. The Department of Defense
sent a U.S. Army general to Liberia to help coordinate DOD’s response to
the outbreak. Some 3,000 U.S. Army also soldiers participated.117 USAID
distributed “protection kits” to vulnerable households in Liberia.118 The
National Institutes of Health (NIH), a component of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), accelerated testing of an experimental
Ebola virus vaccine.119 The CDC deployed over 100 personnel to West
Africa to provide on-the-ground expertise and logistical assistance to
communities suffering from the Ebola pandemic.120 DHS began screening
airline passengers arriving in the United States from the affected West
African nations more closely upon their arrival in the United States.121
Disasters can exacerbate the spread of diseases worldwide. Earthquakes,
for example, can damage water purification and health care facilities.
Communities may rapidly find themselves suffering from outbreaks
of certain illnesses without access to these facilities. Effective disaster
management, which we address in the next section, can prove essential in
protecting communities from post-disaster pandemics.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Natural and man-made disasters routinely pose threats to the United
States. The ways in which those disasters are addressed influence U.S.
international approaches to disaster management worldwide. These
include processes of response, recovery, and resilience carried on
domestically and internationally. The U.S. response to the 2010 Haiti
earthquake, the federal government’s development of a strategy to
absorb international assistance during U.S. disasters, as well as global
accords to address climate change, exemplify this transnational
orientation in disaster management.
The U.S. government’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake illustrates
several of the ways in which U.S. approaches to disaster management
have become transnational. The earthquake devastated Haiti, killing over
300,000 people and rendering more than one million Haitians homeless.122
The earthquake knocked out electricity to the entire capital city of
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Port-au-Prince. The temblor destroyed 14 of 16 government ministry
buildings, the presidential palace, and the parliament building, effectively
decapitating the government.123
The U.S. response to the earthquake began in dramatic fashion. Within
hours after the earthquake, a Haitian government representative drove a
motorbike to the residence of U.S. Ambassador Kenneth H. Merten and
verbally delivered an official request for U.S. government assistance.124
Within less than 24 hours, the first U.S. government team arrived in Haiti
to begin assisting in the disaster recovery process.125 President Obama
designated USAID as the lead U.S. government agency for assisting in the
recovery following the earthquake, though he also ordered the executive
branch to employ a “whole of government” approach.126
DHS contributed significantly to these “whole of government” efforts.
The U.S. Coast Guard ship Forward arrived in Port-au-Prince on January
13, 2010. The Forward’s crew began immediately to aid earthquake
victims. Coast Guard personnel later helped to re-open the country’s
maritime ports.127 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
established an incident support base in Florida. It later deployed an
incident response team and 10 search and rescue groups to Haiti.128 CBP
re-allocated personnel to Miami to help screen and process individuals
entering the United States from Haiti. Following the collapse of a jail in
Haiti, ICE agents helped their Haitian counterparts to identify prisoners
who had escaped.129 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
cleared over 1,000 Haitian children to come to the United States.130 These
examples of DHS assistance to Haiti provide clear evidence of the new
transnational approach to disaster management. At significant expense,
the U.S. government re-allocated DHS personnel and equipment to aid its
Caribbean neighbor.
Besides serving humanitarian needs, this re-allocation of people and gear
also served U.S. homeland security interests. For example, by investing
early in Haiti’s recovery, the U.S. government likely increased the chances
of Haitian earthquake survivors remaining in Haiti, rather than fleeing to
the United States. The United States has seen Haitian immigration crises
in the past. Beginning in the early 1970s, waves of so-called Haitian “boat
people” made their way to the United States.131 The timing of these waves
has often coincided with periods of political and economic turbulence
in Haiti. In 1992, for example, a government coup in Port-au-Prince led
thousands of Haitians to escape by sea to the United States. U.S. Coast
Guard ships intercepted many of these Haitians.132 In 2004, during a period
of both political unrest and grinding poverty, a second wave of Haitians
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made their way to the United States.133 Detaining, interviewing, and
processing these Haitians’ immigration applications comes at significant
cost to the U.S. government. By providing direct aid to Haiti following the
2010 earthquake, the U.S. government was essentially calculating that the
cost of providing direct aid would prove less than the potential unknown
future cost of managing a post-quake immigration wave from Haiti. In
this way, providing direct disaster relief aid to Haiti served U.S. homeland
security interests.
The U.S. transnational approach to disaster management has also worked
in the other direction—that is, when U.S. allies assist the United States
following disasters that take place inside the United States. Although little
reported on at the time, large numbers of U.S. allies offered the United
States government assistance following Hurricane Katrina in 2005.134
The governments of Bangladesh, Thailand, Germany, and Kuwait sent
money, equipment, and personnel to perform tasks like pump out flooded
areas, feed disaster survivors, and rebuild damaged levees.135 The U.S.
government recognized the need to develop an integrated strategy to
absorb and manage these sorts of donations in the future. As a result,
in 2010 DHS published its International Assistance Strategy (IAS), which
sought to develop an organized system for managing aid offers. The DOS
was designated as the lead agency for coordinating foreign offers of
assistance.136 FEMA retains the sole authority under federal law to accept
or reject offers of assistance.137 Moreover, FEMA can make decisions
regarding the disposition of potentially unused donations.138 It is important
to underscore that the IAS is not activated following every federal disaster
declaration. The FEMA Administrator makes that decision depending
upon the conditions he or she faces during the disaster in question.139
Nevertheless, the existence of the IAS demonstrates that DHS recognizes
the importance of a transnational approach to disaster management and
has taken steps to integrate this transnational approach formally into its
daily operations.
Domestic and international initiatives to address the effects of climate
change further illustrate the degree to which disaster management has
become transnational in scope. During the Obama administration, federal
agencies were charged with developing plans, procedures, and strategies
that would take account of the effects of climate change in preparation
for the future.140 To fulfill this charge, in 2013 DHS published a Climate
Action Plan that linked the effects of climate change to DHS’s five mission
areas.141 DHS maintains that the effects of climate change may exacerbate
social tensions and political unrest in areas abroad where state capacity
to address terrorism is limited.142 As a result, climate change, at some
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level, may be one factor that can “enable” terrorist activity.143 At least two
studies support this finding, which suggests that natural disasters can lead
to a rise in domestic and transnational terrorist activity.144 Moreover, DHS
states that climate change can lead to powerful storms that may knock
out vital telecommunications infrastructure. This, in turn, can pose risks
to human lives, especially when persons are unable to contact relevant
authorities during a life-threatening emergency.145
U.S. approaches to disaster management at home and abroad have
become markedly transnational in recent years. In the U.S. government
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the development of an
International Assistance Strategy, and efforts to address climate change,
it is apparent that global events and considerations influence U.S.
government decision-making in the homeland security arena.
The five homeland security sub-fields that we have assessed thus far in
this article each illustrate the growing transnational orientation of U.S.
homeland security policy. In the next section, we begin to outline some
of the most significant implications of this transnational understanding
of homeland security. We also offer suggestions for homeland security
policymakers to integrate this new transnational approach to homeland
security more effectively.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has shown that far from being a purely domestic matter,
homeland security policy today has become transnational in nature, in that
forces and events outside the United States affect U.S. homeland security
policy, both directly and indirectly. There at least three major implications
arising from this shift in our understanding of U.S. homeland security
policy: first, this evolution has implications for institutions that formulate
homeland security policies and suggests a functional realignment among
the organizations charged to implement those policies. Second, this shift
in perspective and paradigm helps illuminate a potential evolution in the
federal approach to homeland security established in the wake of 9/11—an
evolution that represents a more global understanding of the homeland
security field. Third, the traditional frameworks scholars and policy
analysts use to examine and assess homeland security may no longer
provide useful research lenses or produce entirely accurate results. We
examine each of these implications below.
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Implications for Homeland Security Institutions
As we have shown, the federal government places homeland security
officials abroad to protect the American homeland from external
threats.146 This change breaks down old dichotomies and definitions by
which policymakers and analysts in the past drew distinctions with a
difference. The activities of DHS agents and officers overseas blur the
traditional boundaries between national security and law enforcement,
on one hand, and law enforcement and border security, on the other. The
subject matter of their missions more and more frequently coincides. For
this reason, border security and law enforcement capabilities in the future
may come to be viewed as another form of national power, alongside
intelligence, military action, diplomatic activity, depth of financial
capacity, and energy independence. We admittedly are at the threshold
of exploring these shifts, but the requirement to examine them rigorously
and systematically seems clear.147
The federal government institutions dedicated to addressing homeland
security issues also may no longer mesh well with the increasingly
transnational nature of homeland security threats. Historically speaking,
the National Security Council at the White House is the mechanism
through which inter-agency disputes are resolved and “whole of
government” responses engineered. However, homeland security
challenges have spawned new executive-level positions and offices. For
example, President George W. Bush created the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism position in 2001.148 That
position continues to exist. Bush also established via executive order the
White House Homeland Security Council in 2003.149 Bush’s successor,
President Barack Obama, saw homeland security and national security
issues as natural complements. He merged the staffs of the National
Security Council and Homeland Security Council.150 At the same time,
President Obama preserved the independent structures and membership
of the councils themselves.151 At the time of this writing in 2018, President
Trump retains the independent structures of the councils.
Given the evolution of homeland security threats, the NSC’s role in
homeland security has expanded in recent years. Thus, it is not difficult
to envision a future in which the Homeland Security Council and National
Security Council merge entirely. The 2001 creation of the Homeland
Security Council, like DHS itself, reflected the broader public mandate for
the federal government to react quickly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.152 The Homeland Security Council’s structure was based upon the
structure of the National Security Council. Similar to the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council initially complemented a White
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House Office of Homeland Security and a homeland security advisor.153
There was, and remains, significant overlap among the HSC and NSC’s
memberships.154 In light of these factors, merging the HSC and NSC into a
single organization may align them better with the transnational nature of
contemporary homeland security threats.155
Implications for Homeland Security Functions
DHS component personnel stationed abroad promote the “soft” homeland
security power of border security and law enforcement with their foreign
counterparts. The Department’s Office of Policy and International Affairs
leads efforts to forge agreements with DHS’ overseas partners and
works with the international affairs offices in the DHS component offices
to do so.156 The bulk of these agreements pertain to law enforcement
cooperation and training, capacity building programs, and information
sharing.
As DHS’s international role expanded and its fragmented deployment
was coordinated through regional strategies generated internally at
DHS, significant tension resulted with the DOS. The DOS views itself,
consistent with its role in the past, as the U.S. Government’s exclusive
voice in conducting U.S. foreign policy. It has been allocated exclusive
legal authority, for example, to dispense foreign aid and assistance funds.
Yet considering the changed circumstances attendant to homeland
security in a globalized context, it may be helpful for DHS to receive direct
authority and appropriations from Congress to design, fund, and conduct
law enforcement programs abroad. There may also be opportunities for
funding comparable programs in border, aviation, and maritime security
with other host governments. This could potentially facilitate greater
return on DHS’s relationships with foreign partners.
Implications for Homeland Security Scholarship
The analytical tools scholars use to assess U.S. homeland security policy
may also need to adjust to the new transnational homeland security
paradigm. Public policy research has a reputation for being “theory
poor.”157 Public policy scholars frequently borrow or adapt theories and
tools from other disciplines for policy studies of homeland security. Yet
these theories and tools may no longer be adequate. Policy scholars
may look to new sources for theoretical and analytical models. In
particular, international relations and economics offer an array of robust
theories with good explanatory power. These disciplines take account of
governmental, organizational, and individual behavior in their theories.
Tools and theories from these disciplines may help scholars better
understand the transnational forces that influence homeland security
policy today.
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CONCLUSION
The acceleration of globalization and technological innovation since 9/11
has had significant impacts on our understanding of homeland security.
Our international responsibilities have become critical to not only our
physical security, but our economic security, as well. This means that U.S.
homeland security is a shared responsibility—among governments, the
private sector, individuals, and communities. As these trends continue, it
is nearly certain that the interconnections among U.S. homeland security
policy and global security challenges will grow. Transnational homeland
security is here to stay.
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